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THELIMITSOFWTOADJUDICATION: IS
COMPLIANCETHE PROBLEM?
Juscelino F. Colares*
ABSTRACT
Mainstream international trade law scholars have commented positively on
the work of World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicators. This favorable
view is both echoed and challenged by empirical scholarship that shows a
high disparity between Complainant and Respondent success rates
(Complainants win between 80 and 90 percent of the disputes).
Regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists, espe-
cially legalists, believe more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they
point to instances of member recalcitrance to implement rulings as a serious
problem. This article posits that such attempts to strengthen compliance are
ill-advised. After discussing prior empirical analyses of WTO adjudication
involving primary rights and obligations under the WTO agreements (i.e. sub-
stantive adjudication), this article expands the empirical study into compliance
disputes. It finds that ‘enforcement’ proceedings do protect the pro-free trade
interests so overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication. Since that is
the case, this article investigates the extent to which current levels of
non-compliance might constitute a threat to this regime, and theorizes that
the observed level is not only acceptable but a necessary feature of the
system. I conclude by arguing that compliance-related issues must be viewed
in a broader perspective that transcends narrow legalistic views and accounts for
the multifaceted interests of, and differences among, WTO members.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mainstream international trade law scholars characterize the World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system’s handling of cases as one
of the most striking successes of the post-Uruguay Round legacy.1 To them,
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1 See Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review,
and Deference to National Governments’, 90 American Journal of International Law 193
(1996).
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judicialization of trade disputes and the ‘apt’ work of WTO adjudicators in
handling this caseload have increased the normative strength of the nego-
tiated agreements and furthered the status of international trade as a
rules-based regime. This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by
empirical scholarship that shows a high disparity between Complainant and
Respondent success rates.2 Specifically, Complainants win between 80 and
90 percent of the disputes, regardless of the significant range of variation in
subject matter and litigants involved. The more recent empirical study elimi-
nated case docket differences (e.g. case subject matter, party status, income
level and other litigant-specific characteristics), case selection and other al-
ternative hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence. It theorized
that this discrepancy in success rates is the result of a systematic, one-sided
readiness on the part of WTO adjudicators to construe WTO texts as creat-
ing obligations against Respondents, often in disregard of members’ reserved
regulatory competencies and the negotiated standards of review.3
Still, regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists
believe more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they point to in-
stances of member recalcitrance to implement the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) recommendations as a serious problem.4 To this end, they propose
reforms ranging from allowing for collective sanctions through multilateral
enforcement to tightening enforcement deadlines so as to increase the incen-
tives for compliance. This article posits that such attempts to strengthen
compliance are ill-advised. First, the case for a compliance problem is
weak: suspension of concessions seldom occurs, as Respondents tend to
comply after losing the underlying case or following defeat in a compliance
case. Furthermore, the rare instances of non-compliance after litigation has
run its full course do not deprive successful Complainants of all they can
expect to gain from litigating. Beyond allowing for the redress of grievances,
litigation can also give Complainants advantages in ongoing trade negoti-
ations.5 Second, enforcement-enhancing proposals are premised on the
2 See, e.g. John Maton and Carolyn Maton, ‘Independence under Fire: Extra-Legal Pressures
and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 10 Journal of International Economic
Law 317 (2007) (praising the DSB system as ‘independent from Member State influence.’);
Juscelino F. Colares, ‘A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased
Rule Development’, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 383 (2009), at 439 (faulting
the DSB system for embracing an expansive form of judicial lawmaking that ‘consistently
construes WTO law against Respondents’ in substantive adjudication).
3 Colares, above n 2, at 429.
4 See William J. Davey, ‘Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been
Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?’, in Yasuhei
Taniguchi et al. (eds), The WTO in the Twenty-First Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations,
and Regionalism in Asia (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 98; Joost
Pauwelyn, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More
Collective Approach’, 94 American Journal of International Law 335 (2000).
5 See USDA: Brazil Seeks GSM 102 Changes To At Least Match Doha Draft Text, Inside U.S. Trade
World Trade Online (30 April 2010), available at www.insidetrade.com (visited 17 June 2010)
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notion that giving more power to third-parties charged with resolving dis-
putes and monitoring enforcement will necessarily strengthen the normative
obligations already prescribed in the trade agreements. This view naı¨vely
assumes members can be made to comply even when compliance is contrary
to their own interests. Finally, less-than-perfect compliance constitutes no
threat to the trade regime. Rather, it is an essential escape valve in a system
driven by increasing judicialization and adjudicator activism. Viewed in this
more flexible perspective, non-compliance appears as a method of last resort,
accommodating members’ strong political and economic interests as they can
no longer count on the diplomatic flexibility of the previous General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. Accordingly, instead of threatening the
trade system’s normativity, such rare deviations allow its continued operation
while its rules, as interpreted through bilateral litigation, cannot properly ac-
commodate certain losing parties’ strong political economy constraints nor
defer to the notable power asymmetries in the multilateral system.
Section II of this article outlines the general features of the WTO dispute
settlement system and discusses how prior empirical analyses of adjudication
have dealt with the uniform pattern of Complainant success. Since neither
case, litigant or product-specific differences in disputes can account for the
disparity in Complainant/Respondent win rates, I discuss a number of com-
peting theories (e.g. Respondent protectionism, settlement restraint effect,
etc.) and explain why, so far, biased rule development seems to provide the
most compelling explanation for this discrepancy. Section III expands the
empirical analysis into compliance disputes and investigates whether this
type of ‘enforcement’ adjudication protects the pro-free trade interests so
overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication. After detecting that
is the case, I surmise that WTO adjudication is self-consistent, even if WTO
adjudicators do not exhibit any outright bias in compliance cases, as, at that
stage, mere unbiased application of rules will protect prior pro-free trade
results. Section IV investigates the extent to which non-compliance might
constitute a threat to this regime, as prior literature has suggested, and ex-
plains that the current level of non-compliance is a necessary feature of the
international trade system. It also explains why proposals calling for
increased WTO enforcement abilities are unlikely to improve compliance
and posits that a minimum level of non-compliance affords flexibility to an
increasingly judicialized and activist dispute settlement system. The article
concludes by arguing that compliance-related issues must be viewed in a
(describing how Brazil is currently using its victory in the Cotton dispute and its right to retaliate
against the US to either eliminate this WTO-incompatible subsidy program ‘or at least change it
to reflect the latest Doha round agriculture draft modalities text’) and John H. Jackson et al.,
(eds), Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 5th edn. (St
Paul, MN: Thompson/West, 2008), at 321 (stating that ‘WTO members may be tempted to use
the dispute settlement system to try to achieve what has eluded them in negotiations’).
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broader perspective that transcends narrow legalistic views of the trade
regime and accounts for the multifaceted interests of, and differences
among, WTO members.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ADJUDICATION
A. Background of the WTO dispute resolution system
To enable members to protect their bargained-for trade concessions (e.g.
tariff reductions, elimination of non-tariff barriers, market access) against
trade-restrictive measures, the WTO agreements provide a mechanism of
binding dispute settlement.6 WTO panels and the Appellate Body deliberate
and make rulings on disputes submitted by aggrieved members under the
supervision of the ‘DSB’. Specifically, where either a panel or the Appellate
Body finds that a challenged member’s measure ‘impairs or nullifies’ another
member’s ‘benefits accruing’ under one of the ‘covered agreements’, the
adjudicator prepares a final report, and then submits it to the DSB for
formal adoption.7 Once the DSB meets, it must adopt the report unless,
by consensus, it decides against adoption.8
This adoption-by-default rule represents a major departure from the
former GATT system, which required a positive consensus by all parties,
including Respondents, before adoption of a report. Significantly, because
violators can no longer rely on this particular legal safeguard to block en-
forcement, the new WTO regime effectively abolished the formal ‘veto’ in
trade disputes. That, to date, no report has been blocked9 is as much a direct
result of the operation of the new reverse consensus rule as it is proof of how
the system has become increasingly judicialized, i.e. no longer dependent on
final diplomatic negotiations among the affected parties. Suffice it to say that
now the losing Respondent must bring its violating measure(s) into conform-
ity with the prior ruling or face the prospect of lawful retaliation by its
opponent (e.g. increased tariffs, suspension of intellectual property royalty
payments, etc.) by an amount equivalent to the cost of the violation.10
Whether the end of report blocking and the ensuing judicialization did
6 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Arts 1(1),
7(2), 22(3), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU]. By the express language of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 Article 1(a), the provisions of GATT remain effective ‘as rectified, amended or
modified by the terms of the’ more recent WTO agreements. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Art. 1(a), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
7 See GATT 1994 at Art. XXIII; DSU at Arts 16(4) and 17(14).
8 DSU at Art. 17(14).
9 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, Appellate Body Reports,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (visited 6 July 2010).
10 DSU at Art. 22(2).
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effectively remove the veto from the trade system is a question that I examine
later.
B. The legal structure of WTO substantive disputes
By ‘substantive disputes,’ I mean disagreements as to the effective operation
of the various substantive norms in the WTO Agreements, as distinguished
from disagreements as to whether a defeated Respondent has satisfactorily
adopted measures to comply with a prior report or judgment. This distinc-
tion is important not because there is intrinsic value in divining any onto-
logical substance/procedure demarcation criterion in WTO law. Rather, it is
useful because whether adjudication patterns observed in substantive litiga-
tion are also observed in compliance litigation can help one ascertain whether
the WTO adjudicatory system ensures that successful litigants in one stage
also carry their victories to the other stage, when compliance is the issue.
Therefore, only by looking at both types of litigation can one make empirical
statements about whether WTO adjudication is outcome consistent, regard-
less of party status (i.e. aggrieved party or alleged violator), the posture in
which one might appear in a case (i.e. Complainant or Respondent) or the
original subject matter of the dispute (i.e. the agreement under which it
arose).
Among the substantive norms used to gauge whether a measure amounts
to a ‘nullification’ of another member’s rights—thus giving rise to a substan-
tive dispute—the most important are the most-favored-nation (MFN) prin-
ciple, the national treatment or non-discrimination principle, and the general
prohibition against quantitative (i.e. non-tariff) measures. These norms gen-
erally prohibit discrimination among goods and services imported from or
provided by any member and proscribe discrepancies in the treatment of
foreign and domestic goods and services. Such broad requirements are sub-
ject to qualified exceptions. Specifically, members have retained the
GATT-based right to apply offsetting tariffs to ‘dumped’11 or impermissibly
subsidized products that cause material injury to domestic producers.12 A set
of strong public policy exceptions was also preserved from the GATT years.
Among these exceptions are measures deemed necessary to protect public
11 Generally, ‘dumping’ refers to the practice of selling products in the importing market at
prices lower than their ‘normal value’ (e.g. home market price, where available). See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Art. 2, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter AD Agreement].
12 See GATT 1994 at Art. VI; AD Agreement at Art. 3; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Art. 5, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
1867 U.N.T.S. 14, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [herein-
after SCM Agreement].
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morals,13 measures relating to the conservation of natural resources,14 and
emergency trade restrictions that safeguard a member’s balance of pay-
ments.15 In sum, this framework of general rules and exceptions form the
bulk of substantive norms that constitute the most frequent grounds for
bringing and defending against WTO substantive cases, the object of the
empirical analyses to which I now turn.
C. Empirical analyses of substantive case decisions16
1. On avoiding the elephant in the room
Scholarship on WTO dispute settlement is as extensive as it is varied in its
assessment of the system’s overall performance and its methods of inquiry.
I focus primarily on empirical studies because they reveal a curious phenom-
enon: although analyses of case outcomes repeatedly show a high rate of
Complainant success (generally ranging from 80 percent to the high 90s),
there is very little discussion, much less a developed consensus, on what this
might mean. For example, Hudec analyzed GATT dispute outcomes from
1948 to 1989.17 He found that the GATT dispute settlement procedure, the
precursor to the current WTO system, resolved a high percentage of disputes
in favor of Complainants (88 percent overall).18 Nowhere did he attempt to
provide an explanation for the high Complainant win rate, except when he
discussed anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases.
Specifically, Hudec posited that ‘the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD cri-
teria’ and ‘the ascension of AD/CVD measures to a place of importance in
national trade policy might . . .be a sign of other, deeper tendencies toward
noncompliant behavior.’19 Unfortunately, other than an expression of his
ideological opposition to these types of laws, Hudec’s explanation limits
itself to a particular set of cases and offers merely a conclusory assertion
that Respondents lost because they are protectionists. That GATT/WTO
Respondent and Complainant win rates have continued to diverge over
time, when the positive theory of litigation suggests they should converge
at some point,20 apparently has not prompted much reflection beyond the
13 GATT 1994 at Art. XX(a).
14 Ibid, at Art. XX(g).
15 Ibid, at Arts V, XII.
16 Unfortunately, all prior empirical studies of WTO litigation (except that of Colares) are based
on datasets that do not distinguish between substantive and compliance disputes. Because
overall results in all studies are quite similar, this distinction, though important for purposes
of Part III, will not be considered here.
17 See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT
Legal System (Salem: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), at 273.
18 Ibid, at 353.
19 Ibid, at 355.
20 George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, 13 Journal
of Legal Studies 1 (1984), at 19. Specifically, the theory suggests that, absent information and
stake asymmetries, parties tend to adjust their taste for litigation based on signals emanating
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traditional ‘Respondent qua protectionist’ fall back narrative. Indeed, this
puzzle remained unaddressed until quite recently.
Some empirical studies have been more ambitious, however, in that they
attempt to test hypotheses about the operation of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system, going beyond mere description of the main variables of litiga-
tion. Although not squarely addressing the question of concern here, these
studies offer important theoretical explanations about phenomena related to
the evolution of the WTO adjudicatory system. For instance, Guzman and
Simmons look at settlement activity in WTO litigation and find that trans-
action costs, such as domestic political economy constraints, members’ in-
ability to make deals involving transfers in unrelated areas and members’
general reluctance to procure settlement via cash payments, reduce the
scope of settlement activity in WTO adjudication.21 They also raise an im-
portant theoretical issue: the operation of the MFN principle might limit
members’ willingness to enter into settlements because they hesitate to
offer concessions that ‘may have to be granted to every WTO member
state.’22 This insight is significant because if, due to some feature of the
WTO system’s design, members face significant settlement constraints,
high Complainant win rates might be attributed to Respondents’ inability
to settle. Similarly, despite its tremendous significance, this settlement-
limitation effect has not received the attention it deserves (I return to this
point later).
With a similar focus on settlement activity, Busch and Reinhardt find that
Complainants are more likely to obtain better concessions in the consult-
ations (i.e. pre-litigation) stage than later. They posit that the onset of full
blown litigation increases domestic pressures in favor of the challenged trade
restrictive measure and, thus, reduces the incentives for settlement.23
Whether the MFN principle does in fact constrain settlement activity or
whether the start of actual litigation reduces the size of settlements, none
of these articles say much about how the settlement rate is likely to affect the
Complainant and Respondent litigation calculus and likelihood of success.24
2. The dominant narrative’s blind spot
As discussed, most empirical analyses of WTO litigation either do not meas-
ure or fail to fully address the continuing success disparity between
from the litigation environment, with stronger cases settling rather than going to full
adjudication.
21 See Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, ‘To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis
of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO’, 31 Journal of Legal Studies 205 (2002), at 210–
11.
22 Ibid, at 210.
23 See Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement
in GATT/WTO Disputes’, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 158 (2000), at 162–63.
24 But see Colares, above n 2, at 413–16.
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Complainants and Respondents.25 Despite occasionally noting the empirical
regularity in Complainants’ very high win rate, the empirical literature’s re-
markable fascination with the increasing judicialization of the WTO system
and its casual adoption of received ‘Respondent qua protectionist’ narratives
contributes to an astonishing lack of reflection on the reasons for such an
important asymmetry in the system. As an example, take the rarely ques-
tioned received view that a dispute resolution system predicated on free trade
exists to correct the potential politically motivated ‘tilt’ of national agencies
in favor of trade restrictive measures that put national trade policy in direct
collision with international commitments.26 Following this view, many com-
mentators surmise, as Hudec and others do, that the high rate of national
agency loss at the WTO (reflected in Respondents’ very low win rate) is a
mere direct result of the WTO adjudicatory system doing what it is supposed
to do: reversing the effects of national agency protectionist bias.27
However, reliance on such a broad agency capture argument is problem-
atic. For a while, agency capture might result from domestic producers’
political mobilization to obtain trade protection, the same argument can be
used to demonstrate that it is at least equally plausible that foreign produ-
cers, in alliance with import-consuming industries, are also able to engage in
similar rent-seeking efforts, since the costs that duties imposed on them may
25 See, e.g. Hudec, above n 17, at 355 (discussing the growth in the use of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism by all parties); William J. Davey, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement
System: The First Ten Years’, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 17 (2005), at 18
(focusing solely on the success of the ‘major users’ of the WTO dispute settlement system
when they appear as Complainants); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘Does the U.S. Support International
Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System’, in Cesare Romano (ed), The Sword
and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 322 (arguing that, as a Complainant, the US ‘has
been successful in virtually all of the cases it has pursued seriously,’ and explaining that the
US generally complies when it loses because the DSB and the WTO rules-based system
maximize US economic interests); and Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter?
Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the WTO (Int’l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue Paper No. 2, 2008) (theorizing
that least developed countries are less likely to bring claims at the WTO due to a weaker legal
capacity).
26 See, e.g. Gary Horlick, WTO & NAFTA Rules and Dispute Resolution: Selected Essays on
Antidumping, Subsidies & Other Measures (London: Cameron May, 2003), at 15; Judith
Goldstein, ‘International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American
‘‘Unfair’’ Trade Laws’, 50 International Organization 541 (1996); John M. Mercury,
‘Chapter 19 of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989–95: A Check on
Administered Protection?’, 15 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 525
(1995); Arun Venkataraman, ‘Note, Binational Panels and Multilateral Negotiations: A
Two-Track Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection’, 37 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 533 (1999), at 578–79.
27 See, Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford; NY:
Oxford University Press, 2005) 148 (proposing that as bound tariffs decline, states have an
incentive to cheat ‘by inventing . . .nontariff barriers that [are] fiendishly obscure,’ thus perpe-
tuating the received view that national agencies are but agents of protectionism).
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exceed the benefits that domestic producers might derive from them. In fact,
many US administrative proceedings, especially in the AD/CVD area, involve
at least as concentrated downstream US consuming industries as they involve
US producers seeking trade barriers (e.g. softwood lumber, steel, wheat,
pork, etc.). As members of highly integrated industries in vertical production
chains, foreign producers and domestic importing interests may actually pre-
sent better candidates for collective action. Although not all agencies behave
alike, at a minimum, one must view agency action as reflecting more than
just domestic producers’ rent-seeking efforts.
While the broader empirical question of whether national agencies have
been faithful to the intent of the WTO agreements when applying national
law lies outside the scope of this article, one must acknowledge that high
Complainant success rates and their corollary, high rates of agency loss, are
hardly direct evidence of bias correction, much less a confirmation that na-
tional trade restricting measures are protectionist. The empirical literature’s
tendency to look favorably at WTO litigation is at least partly attributable to
its reliance on half-thought, outdated narratives that view this adjudicatory
system as merely engaged in bias correction; a view that has not received the
reflection it deserves. Indeed, regardless of one’s subjective views on the
national agency bias question, whether WTO adjudication’s high rate of
Complainant success and agency loss is a response to captured agency de-
cision making should be openly investigated and discussed, not assumed
away as commentators rush to look at other presumably more testable
hypotheses.
3. Complainant and Respondent success rate asymmetry: the search for an answer
Two studies sought to explain Complainants’ overall high success rate in
WTO adjudication and, for this reason, stand apart. Maton and Maton
analyzed all WTO disputes through 2004 and find that Complainants win
81.9 percent of panel rulings.28 They also determined that neither
Complainants’ economic power, previous use of the DSB, nor the presence
of third-party litigants can account for Complainants’ win rate.29 In light of
these results, Maton and Maton refuted prior anecdotal studies30 that sug-
gested WTO adjudicators are influenced by extra-legal pressures from more
powerful members.31 In concluding that their findings demonstrate WTO
adjudicators ‘are immune from such pressures,’32 the authors, as others
before them, passed on the opportunity to further investigate or theorize
on their other major finding: the Complainant/Respondent success
asymmetry.
28 Maton and Maton, above n 2, at 328.
29 Ibid, at 325–28.
30 Ibid, at 320–21.
31 Ibid, at 333.
32 Ibid, at 333.
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a. Why immunity from member influence matters. Admittedly, Maton &
Maton’s finding that WTO adjudicators are not sensitive to Complainants’
economic power is relevant as far as the win-rate asymmetry is concerned: it
eliminates one major source of bias from consideration. Yet, the absence of
favoritism toward great economic powers, such as the USA, EU and Japan,
cannot prove that WTO adjudication is ‘immune’ from every source of bias.
Because WTO adjudication is essentially a ‘bilateral means’ of solving trade
disputes in a multilateral system,33 observing a few major countries’ success
rates as Complainants could hardly provide the ultimate test for detecting all
sources of bias. Arguably, any eventual tilt in the system is much more likely
to express itself in the triumph of one version of multilateralism over another
(e.g. adopting an activist liberal view of trade versus adopting a jurispru-
dence that balances free trade against legitimate trade restrictions) rather
than in the adoption of one or a few members’ unilateral preferences.
Indeed, powerful member influence, though undeniable, is significantly
diluted in an organization with 153 members (as of July 2008).34
Thus, besides coding for winners and losers, to find any bias in the WTO
adjudicatory system, one would have to look beyond the identity of the liti-
gant (i.e. Country A or Country B) to the posture in which a litigant is
appearing (i.e. Complainant or Respondent), and the arguments each is
making under WTO law. For example, if it turns out that the same countries
exhibiting high rates of success as Complainants also have low rates of suc-
cess as Respondents, then one might be justified not only to discard bias for
or against such countries—as Maton & Maton did—but also wonder if there
is a bias against all Respondents. Yet, before one could make an argument
for such bias, one should investigate whether other variables, such as case
subject matter, differences in standards of review or type of product affected
by a measure, might account for the discrepancy in Complainant and
Respondent success rates. In fact, if parties’ relative success rates are some-
how correlated with variations among the agreements invoked, then adjudi-
cators are merely adjusting their decisions in accordance with such variations
rather than being biased against Respondents. However, if one finds consist-
ently high Complainant success rates regardless of case type differences, then
one might inquire whether adjudicators’ adoption of certain interpretive pos-
itions varies with respect to the posture of the litigant and the argument it
makes. Only when the latter occurs can one consider the presence of bias.
Although Maton and Maton did not venture into formulating or rejecting
such alternative explanations, they suggested that further research,
33 See Goldsmith and Posner, above n 27, at 135.
34 See Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (visited 25 April 2011).
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incorporating a wider range of variables, would be necessary to more fully
understand WTO adjudication.35
b. The case for biased rule development. Colares accepted Maton and Maton’s
recommendation. He used a more comprehensive database that both
included more recent cases (through September 2007) and coded for the
usual variables (e.g. Income Level, Third-Party Involvement, etc.) as well as
a number of additional variables (e.g. Case Type, Party Identity, Product
Type, etc.).36 One illustration: when considering the agreements under
which disputes arose (coded under the ‘Case Type’ variable), Colares
hypothesized that the specific, more agency-deferential standard of review
in the AD Agreement should lead to lower Complainant success rates in AD
cases than the general, less deferential ‘objective assessment’ standard of
review applicable to disputes arising under other agreements.37 He found
that despite the agency-friendly, Chevron-like level of deference under the
AD agreement,38 Respondent win rates were actually lower (9 percent) in
AD cases than in any other type of dispute.39
After finding that Complainants’ success rates remained high (i.e. 80 per-
cent and above) regardless of differences in categories of cases and litigants
considered, Colares discussed why none of the alternative empirical explan-
ations, such as case selection, stake and information asymmetries and the
potential MFN settlement-constraint effect, could account for Complainants’
stellar litigation performance.40 In fact, because neither case-specific distinc-
tions, litigant-based variations nor alternative explanations could explain
Complainant success and the same countries exhibiting high rates of success
as Complainants also had low rates of success as Respondents, Colares pon-
dered the possibility of a bias against all Respondents.41 This bias, defined as
‘the result of a process of authoritative normative evolution . . . that
expresse[s] itself with a tilt favoring Complainants,’42 if detected in WTO
decision patterns, could explain Complainants’ pervasive success in every
type of WTO substantive dispute.
To verify the existence of such pro-Complainant decisional patterns,
Colares looked closely at two sets of cases: the first ten AD disputes,
where adjudicators would presumably explain their views on the AD
35 Maton and Maton, above n 2, at 333–34.
36 Colares, above n 2, at 402–12.
37 DSU at Art. 11.
38 See AD Agreement at Art. 17(6) (stating that a national measure will be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon a permissible interpretation of law and that agencies’ fact
findings will not be disturbed, even when ‘the panel might have reached a different conclu-
sion,’ so long as they are ‘unbiased and objective’).
39 Colares, above n 2, at 403.
40 Ibid, at 412–22.
41 Ibid, at 422.
42 Ibid.
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Agreement’s more agency deferential standard of review; and disputes invol-
ving the use of declarations arising under different agreements (e.g. AD,
GATT, SCM and the Agreement on Government Procurement43).44 He
explained the choice of these cases on two separate grounds. First, the AD
cases not only have important precedential value as early cases, but also
contain the WTO adjudicators’ earliest and most considered justification
for striking down agencies’ decisions under the most pro-agency standard.45
Indeed, in light of the high rate of agency reversal in these disputes, this
would be the ideal setting in which to verify the occurrence of bias. Second,
the cases involving declarations span different areas under WTO law, thus
providing a broader context in which to detect bias. Moreover, in these
cases, Respondents and Complainants argued for and against giving binding
effect to declarations, and WTO adjudicators made seemingly irreconcilable
rulings, sometimes construing declarations as binding, other times constru-
ing them as merely aspirational.46 Should decisions to give declarations one
effect or the other effect vary with respect to the posture in which a litigant
appears, one would not only reconcile these rulings, but argue bias is at least
a plausible explanation, since declarations embody the intent of negotiators
during the same round of negotiations, employ similar language and, thus,
presumably deserve the same treatment.
In both sets of cases, Colares identified two central tendencies: hollowing
out Respondents’ rights under the agreements (e.g. by conflating the AD and
DSU standards of review into an amorphous de novo standard, by giving no
effect to declarations that favor Respondents, etc.) and expanding the scope of
Respondents’ obligations beyond the negotiated agreements (e.g. by creating ex-
traneous, ad hoc tests to gauge Respondents’ conduct during investigations,
by finding an obligation to engage in multilateral negotiations before imple-
menting regulations where none previously existed, etc.).47 He argues that,
combined, these decisions have promoted trade liberalization at the expense
of the reservations members made during negotiations, effectively reducing
Respondents’ regulatory discretion.48 While, legally, the result is a jurispru-
dence that ‘clarifies the existing provisions of the agreements consistently in
one direction’49 (i.e. in favor of Complainants), politically, the practical con-
sequence is the continuous ‘transfer of decisional power’ away from members
43 Agreement on Government Procurement, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
44 Colares, above n 2, at 423–24, 429–30.
45 Ibid, at 429–30.
46 Ibid, at 430–35.
47 Ibid, at 436.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid (citation omitted).
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to a select few WTO adjudicators.50 This creation of non-negotiated obliga-
tions under the guise of interpreting the negotiated agreements, Colares
argues, goes beyond the scope of the original authorization to act as neutral
third parties in disputes involving endogenously incomplete contracts.51 In
sum, Colares faults WTO adjudicators not for completing the ‘optimally
incomplete’ WTO agreements, but for completing them consistently against
Respondents.52
That WTO adjudicators’ interpretive positions across a broad range of
disputes vary with respect to the posture and argument of the litigant ex-
plains why focusing on the identity of particular winners and losers would
not reveal the tangible bias in the system. Yet, case-transcending trends do
exist, can account for the systematic pro-Complainant win rate and, more
importantly, can explain the puzzling lack of convergence in Complainant
and Respondent success rates, even after a decade and a half of operation.53
c. Challenges to biased rule development. If case selection, information asym-
metry and stake asymmetry cannot account for the sustained pattern of
Complainant success, as Colares claims,54 then bias is a serious contender
among theories that would explain why WTO adjudication outcomes deviate
from the positive theory of litigation’s prediction that Complainants and
Respondents must experience a roughly equivalent share of litigation success.
One still has to consider the potential explanatory power of a few additional
theoretical rivals: the familiar ‘Respondent qua protectionist’ argument, the
‘settlement-restraint’ effect and the ‘low volume of filings’ paradox.
i. The Respondent qua protectionist argument. As the most commonly
advanced explanation for the sustained pattern of Complainant success
in dispute resolution,55 the protectionist argument is overbroad in its as-
sumption that Respondents are always motivated by protectionist pressures,
never acting to vindicate legitimate, WTO-compliant regulatory policy.
Remarkably, protectionism alone cannot fully explain why WTO adjudicators
would develop an AD jurisprudence that disregards the more deferential AD
standard of review if they are merely reacting against cheating.56 If that were
50 Ibid, at 437.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid, at 397 (citation omitted).
53 The data in this article is current through September 2009 and confirms Colares’ prior
results. Compare Colares, above n 2, at 419–422 with Part III.B.3.
54 Colares, above n 2, at 412–13, 416–17 (citation omitted).
55 See generally Horlick, above n 26, at 15; Goldstein, above n 26; Mercury, above n 26; Hudec,
above n 17; J. Michael Finger and Tracey Murray, ‘Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Enforcement in the United States’ in J. Michael Finger (ed), Antidumping: How it Works and
Who Gets Hurt? (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress, 1993), at 241.
56 See, e.g. Colares, above n 2, at 423–29 (demonstrating how the Egypt – Steel Rebar panel, in
applying the DSU ‘objective assessment’ standard of review (Art. 11) ‘simultaneously’ with
the AD standard (Art. 17.6(i)), engaged in a more intrusive review of the agency’s fact-finding
than the AD standard authorizes).
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true, members would simply not meet the standard, no matter how leniently
or restrictively construed. Similarly, agency protectionism cannot reconcile
rulings that give different effect to declarations, shifting their legal status
according to the particular interests advanced by Complainants while re-
straining otherwise legitimate agency action.57 In sum, the result is a pattern
of decisions that systematically favors Complainants not because adjudicators
are correcting national agency protectionism, but because adjudicators have
adopted a result-driven, teleological version of free trade that requires such
interpretive contortions.
ii. The settlement–restraint effect. A more serious competitor to the bias
theory would be the existence of structural constraints on Respondents’ abil-
ity to settle disputes. As discussed earlier, Guzman and Simmons suggest
that the MFN principle might constrain settlement activity because offering
concessions in one dispute, a prerequisite for any settlement, triggers the
obligation to extend similar concessions to all other WTO members.58
Arguably, in light of the MFN requirement, Respondents would naturally
hesitate to offer concessions, opting instead for full adjudication of even weak
cases, which, in turn, would explain their higher than expected,
non-converging rate of loss. If this argument is well founded, Colares’ bias
theory would be harder to support, for even in unbiased adjudication,
Respondents’ win rates could not converge with Complainants’ win rates if
Respondents are consistently adjudicating weak cases. However, this
settlement-restraint effect is theoretically flawed and can be refuted empiric-
ally. While theoretically bound by the MFN requirement, WTO members
are exempt from extending concessions to all other members when they are
already in or enter into Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), a fundamen-
tal exception to the MFN principle.59 Although one would not argue that
members enter into PTAs solely for this particular reason, their existence
frees members from the MFN’s unconditional multilateral reciprocation
requirement, thus attenuating any settlement-constraining effect that the op-
eration of this principle might cause.
The MFN thesis also fails empirically. Colares tested its plausibility by
separately regressing Respondents’ trade-to-GDP ratios and import-to-
GDP ratios against their settlement rates. If the MFN principle has a
settlement-constraining effect, Colares hypothesized, this effect will increase
as Respondents’ trade dependence increases. Specifically, the higher a
Respondent’s trade-to-GDP or import-to-GDP ratio is, the less likely it is
to settle, because any concession granted has a comparatively larger impact
57 See, e.g. ibid, at 430–35 (comparing the interpretation of a pro-Respondent declaration as
merely aspirational in US – Leaded Bar with the interpretation of a pro-Complainant declar-
ation as effectively binding in US – Shrimp/Turtle).
58 See Guzman and Simmons, above n 21, at 210 and GATT 1994 at Art. I.
59 Ibid, at Art. XXIV.
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on its economy.60 Because neither of these regression models, nor their in-
dividual regressors, were statistically significant (0.05 probability level),
Colares refuted the hypothesis that Respondents’ concerns over the potential
economic impact of concessions (the MFN effect) depresses the settlement
rate. The lack of empirical support for an MFN-based settlement-
constraining effect, besides providing indirect support to the idea that
there are flexible ways around the MFN principle, also conforms to earlier
findings of substantial settlement activity in GATT/WTO litigation.61
Because the MFN thesis has clear theoretical limitations and is contradicted
by empirical evidence, the high rate of Respondent losses cannot be the
product of Respondents having to litigate weak cases that cannot be settled.
This does not mean that Respondents litigate only strong cases, it merely
demonstrates that MFN pressures cannot account for the lack of win-rate
convergence.
iii. The low volume of filings paradox. Finally, one may counter that if the
high rate of Complainant success is the result of bias, then it would be
difficult to explain the paradoxically small number of disputes adjudicated
so far (117 adopted reports as of September 2009). That rational
Complainants would file cases seriatim to maximize utility from biased adju-
dication is hardly the necessary result, however. In a multilateral system,
high success in bilateral litigation will not necessarily lead to more filings if
Complainants realize that every trade liberalizing decision creates precedent
that further restricts the universe of regulatory choices they may want to
adopt in the future. Viewed in this way, appearing before a court that is more
than willing to restrain members ability to regulate trade can produce an inter-
esting form of ‘winner’s curse,’ and would thus explain why a potentially biased
adjudicator might not be so attractive, even to the favored litigant. In fact, in
this system, the most litigious members have also been the most frequent
Respondents and the latter experience might explain their caution to use a
system that will further reduce their discretion as sovereign states. It is plausible
that their inability to achieve a similar level of success as Complainants when
appearing in the opposite posture has apparently served them well.
d. Implications of biased rule development. The bias theory, if correct, would
fill a significant gap in the empirical literature on WTO adjudication, a gap
60 Colares, above n 2, at 414–15.
61 See Busch and Reinhardt, above n 23, at 158–59 (stating that ‘three-fifths of all disputes end
prior to a panel ruling, and most of these without a request for a panel even being made’). It
should be noted that their methodology for counting cases differs from Colares’ methodology.
Unlike Busch and Reinhardt, who count cases from the moment a request for consultations is
made (i.e. including the pre-litigation stage), Colares counts only cases in which a panel is
requested. This explains why Colares finds a much lower rate of settlement (about 30 per-
cent). See Colares, above n 2, at 413. As discussed in Part III B.3, this difference is quite
important in the discussion regarding case selection.
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that, to date, has not been closed by any serious, overarching explanation for
the existence of a strikingly uniform pattern of Complainant success, regard-
less of case, litigant or product-specific differences in disputes.
A pro-Complainant bias would imply that, far from optimally balancing
the value of trade liberalization against the interest in regulatory diver-
sity—a balance that members struck by negotiating terms intended to safe-
guard ‘the values and norms that shape’62 their different societies
(e.g. GATT, Art. XX)—WTO adjudicators have adopted an ambitious judi-
cial philosophy that teleologically advances a liberal view of trade and devi-
ates from the considered original will of the WTO members.
This finding has many other serious implications, some of which Colares
discussed (e.g. displacement of members’ legitimate policy choices, impact
on current trade negotiations, etc.),63 but, more importantly, it may explain
why some powerful members, in the absence of a formal veto, have occa-
sionally delayed compliance or refused to comply with certain DSB judg-
ments. After all, if the involvement of third parties does not lead to
consistently neutral verdicts, then dispute resolution is no longer superior
to bilateral normal diplomatic channels or, depending on the stakes involved,
occasional non-compliance,64 the topic to which I now turn.
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF COMPLIANCE ADJUDICATION
A. General remarks
As previously explained (see Section II A), following DSB adoption of a
panel or Appellate Body report, the offending country must eliminate the
violating measure and bring its practices into compliance with the ruling.65
Members must comply within a ‘reasonable time,’66 as failure to do so trig-
gers the possibility of suspension of concessions (i.e. retaliation) on the part
of the prevailing member.67 When it is impractical for a Member to comply
immediately, members may resort to binding arbitration to determine the
‘reasonable period of time’ for compliance (Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration).68
Where there is disagreement regarding whether a member has complied with
the panel or AB’s recommendations, the DSB designates, when possible, the
original panel (i.e. the panel that decided the substantive case) to settle such
disputes (Article 21(5) Review).69 Should the original Complainant also
62 Dani Rodrik, ‘Feasible Globalizations’, in Michael M. Weinstein (ed), Globalization: What’s
New? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 196, at 199.
63 Colares, above n 2, at 435–38.
64 See Andrew Guzman, ‘Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms’, 31 Journal of Legal Studies 303 (2002), at 307–8.
65 DSU at Art. 23(2)(a).
66 Ibid, at Art. 22(1).
67 See ibid, at Art. 22.
68 Ibid, at Art. 21(3)(c).
69 See ibid, at Art. 21(5).
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prevail in the latter type of dispute, it may request compensation (e.g. further
tariff concessions, increased market access, etc.) in lieu of suspending con-
cessions against the offending member.70 Finally, when disputes over the
level or method of retaliation arise, members shall submit such disputes to
arbitration (Article 22(6) Arbitration), which shall also ‘be carried out by the
original panel,’ if these adjudicators are available.71 In these cases, the arbi-
trator’s jurisdiction is limited to the amount of nullification or impairment and
whether the form of retaliation is allowed under the agreements; the arbitrator
may not revisit previously litigated issues.72 Since the mere possibility of apply-
ing such countermeasures provides a substantial incentive for compliance,
suspension of WTO obligations against the offending member is generally
the exception—members usually comply or offer some form of compensation.
B. An empirical analysis of compliance decisions
1. A caveat on the implications of posture reversals
Clearly, compliance disputes involve issues ancillary to, yet not directly invol-
ving, adjudication of WTO substantive rules. Remarkably, previous empirical
scholarship on WTO adjudication tends not to segregate and compare com-
pliance and substantive adjudication when analyzing the overall operation of
the system. Yet, the issues decided under each type of litigation are not the
same. Specifically, whereas substantive adjudication considers whether mem-
bers’ conduct conforms to their primary WTO obligations, compliance ad-
judication considers members’ conduct with respect to a duty of a derived or
secondary nature: the duty to comply with WTO rulings.
This distinction would not matter so much if one observed no major
discrepancies in outcomes between these forms of litigation. Even if that
proved to be the case, however, having a similar outcome profile does not
obviate the need to investigate how each form of litigation might affect
Complainants’ and Respondents’ interests differently. For example,
Complainants in substantive disputes may not be Complainants in certain
compliance disputes. In Article 22(6) ‘Level of Suspension’ Arbitration, a
former successful Complainant might appear as Respondent if the erstwhile
Respondent challenges the amount of retaliation the erstwhile Complainant
believes it can rightfully impose pursuant to its prior victory. In this particu-
lar context, the current Complainant’s grievance is the erstwhile
Complainant’s proposed level of retaliation, which will only be an impermis-
sible trade restriction if it exceeds the level of actual nullification or impair-
ment (i.e. over deterrence). Therefore, the potential for significant posture
reversals blurs the categories of litigants and disturbs the conventional per-
ception of the interests that litigants represent. As the example illustrates,
70 See ibid, at Art. 22(2).
71 Ibid, at Art. 22(6).
72 See ibid, at Art. 22(7).
The Limits of WTO Adjudication 419
traditional perceptions of erstwhile Complainants as favoring trade liberal-
ization and erstwhile Respondents as wishing to restrict trade are no longer
accurate and must be abandoned.
Given this possibility, posture reversals might call into question any gen-
eralizations about the relative success of Complainants in WTO adjudication
that do not account for the different interests that Complainants and
Respondents may represent in different litigation contexts. Thus, if WTO
adjudication is indeed biased towards a particular version of free trade that
produces a systematic pattern of Complainant wins in substantive cases, that
bias is not likely to manifest itself in favor of Complainants when they no
longer defend the pro-free trade argument at the compliance stage. This
caveat leads to two insights: the first somewhat trivial, the second a bit
more surprising. First, because a bias in favor of a particular version of
free trade expresses itself in the vindication of that interest, not in the success
of the litigant who may have originally spoken for it, compliance outcomes
need not be as systematically pro-Complainant as substantive outcomes.
A ‘litigant reversal’ effect, the result of possible shifts in Complainant and
Respondent interests at the compliance stage will disturb the systematic pat-
tern of high Complainant wins in substantive adjudication. Second, since
mere unbiased application of compliance rules is enough to protect the
prior extremely pro-free trade results achieved in substantive litigation,
WTO adjudicators need not exhibit any bias in compliance litigation: ensur-
ing the enforcement of prior judgments is all it takes. If these two trends are
observed, one should be able to conclude that WTO adjudication is unsur-
prisingly self-consistent, even if biased.
2. Data and methods
a. Defining a compliance case. For purposes of this study, a ‘compliance
case’ is a dispute in which a WTO member challenges another member’s
conduct in light of its duty to comply with, or its rights under, a prior WTO
ruling. These disputes occur some time after the DSB adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report and are primarily concerned with enforcement.
Compliance adjudication involves the three major disputes defined in
Section III A, i.e. Article 21(3)(c) ‘Reasonable Time’ Arbitration; Article
21(5) ‘Conformity’ Review; and Article 22(6) ‘Level of Suspension’
Arbitration. As usual, data on such adjudication was collected from the
WTO case database.73
b. Determining compliance case outcomes. A compliance case is deemed ‘final’
when the DSB either adopts panel or Appellate Body reports following
Article 21(5) Reviews or approves the results from Article 21(3)(c) and
Article 22(6) Arbitrations. A ‘settled’ compliance case is any case in
73 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm (visited 7 July 2010).
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which: (i) the complaining party withdraws the panel or arbitration request;
(ii) the DSB defers the establishment of a panel74 (usually due to a request
by both parties); (iii) the DSB establishes a panel,75 but there has been no
reported activity in the past three years; (iv) the parties formally request that
a panel stop its work76 or agree to postpone arbitration and neither panel nor
arbitrator engage in deliberations for more than 12 months (lapse of author-
ity); or (v) the parties officially notify the DSB that they have reached an
agreed solution in a panel or arbitration proceeding.77 Finally, a compliance
case is considered ‘active’ when a panel or arbitration request has been made
and the panel, Appellate Body or arbitrator is currently working toward a
formal disposition of the case or the parties have been engaged in negoti-
ations for 12 months or less. Table 1 contains a breakdown of all WTO cases
from January 1995 to September 2009.
These 61 final compliance rulings arose out of 42 original substantive
disputes. Given that, to date, a total of 117 DSB substantive reports have
been adopted, this indicates that outright compliance occurred about 64
percent of the time (75 out 117 cases),78 with the remaining decisions (42
cases) eventually leading to some kind of compliance dispute.
Before providing a more detailed analysis of compliance litigation out-
comes, a few methodological points are in order. First, litigants’ success
rates are calculated from the universe of final rulings (settled and active
cases are not considered). Second, as usual, a Complainant is the party
that initially files a request for a compliance proceeding. Since Article 22.6
arbitrations are mostly filed by erstwhile Respondents seeking lower levels of
retaliation (i.e. less trade restriction) on its exports, the reader should
Table 1. Status of compliance cases
Case status Number of cases
DSB final rulings 61
Settled 17
Active 4
Total 81
74 See DSU at Art. 6(1).
75 See ibid, at Art. 6.
76 See ibid, at Art. 12(12).
77 See ibid, at Art. 3(6).
78 Busch and Reinhardt found that the compliance rate increased from 40 percent under GATT
to 66 percent under the WTO. See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘Testing International
Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Daniel L. M. Kennedy
and James D. Southwick (eds), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in
Honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 457. Another
study, focusing on the first 10 years of WTO dispute settlement, reported an 83% compliance
rate. See William Davey, ‘Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 42 Cornell
International Law Journal 119 (2009).
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abandon traditional characterizations of litigants and focus instead on the
interests they are likely to represent. Third, a Complainant wins a case any
time it prevails in its major claim, regardless of a Respondent’s occasional
success in one or more secondary claims. Eliminating the possibility of
‘mixed’ cases in this manner simplifies the description and analysis of the
results without compromising accuracy.
3. Results
A mode of dispute settlement essentially concerned with enforcement, com-
pliance adjudication focuses on timing to comply, whether compliance has
occurred and whether the proposed level of retaliation correctly reflects the
level of trade impaired. Table 2 illustrates the distribution of compliance
cases. It shows that the vast majority of compliance adjudications (52
cases or 85.25 percent) never reach the retaliation stage, as members may
only retaliate after obtaining authorization, which requires filing for arbitra-
tion under DSU Article 22(6). Considering that only nine disputes out of
117 cases (7.69 percent) came to this final stage, one can conclude, as others
have,79 that the WTO dispute settlement system has an admirable record of
compliance. That offending members may at times abuse the system to gain
a temporary trade advantage—first, violating a rule; second, litigating a po-
tentially meritless case; third, resisting compliance by exploiting procedural
tactics at the compliance stage only to finally comply (or not)—does not
belittle this record. From ad hoc diplomacy to stronger sanctions authorized
by third-party adjudicators, alternative methods of dispute settlement, with
varying structures of incentives, simply cannot ensure countries will act with
good faith in all international economic relations.
Although one should be cautious when interpreting results based on a
limited number of cases, a look at how litigants have performed across com-
pliance case categories reveals that Complainant Success Rates vary between
56 percent and 92 percent (Table 3). Clearly, Complainants’ success rates
Table 2. Compliance cases
Compliance case types Number of
compliance cases
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration 26
Article 21(5) Review 26
Article 22(6) Arbitration 9
Total 61
79 See, e.g. Davey, above n 78, at 122; Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Enforcement of WTO
Judgments’, 34 Yale Journal of International Law 558 (2009), at 562; Jide Nzelibe, ‘The
Case Against Reforming the WTO Enforcement Mechanism’, 2008 University of Illinois
Law Review 319 (2008), at 323. Part IV will discuss some of these authors’ assessments
and critical views regarding compliance in the WTO system.
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are no longer uniformly high, as in substantive adjudication. This wide vari-
ation in litigants success rates might be an early indication that, at least at
this stage, adjudication is responsive to the relative strengths and weaknesses
of litigants cases. Yet, the occurrence of litigant reversals in compliance
adjudication calls for a closer scrutiny of Complainant win rates.
To examine the potential impact of a litigant reversal effect, I looked at
erstwhile Complainants’ performance in compliance adjudication. This
required accounting for all instances in which the Complainant in the under-
lying WTO dispute became the Respondent in the compliance proceeding.
This happened in four of 26 Article 21(3)(c) arbitrations80 and in eight of
nine Article 22(6) arbitrations.81 Again, as Table 4 illustrates, erstwhile
Table 3. Complainant win rates in compliance cases
Compliance case type Complainant
success rate (%)
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration 76.92
Article 21(5) Review 92.31
Article 22(6) Arbitration 55.56
80 See Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/
13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, 1833; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS87/15, WT/DS110/14, 23 May
2000, DSR 2000:V, 2583; Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS114/13, 18
August 2000, DSR 2002:I, 3; Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and
Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU, WT/DS207/13, 17 March 2003, DSR 2003:III, 1237.
81 See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of
the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB, 12 July 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1105; Decision by the Arbitrators,
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse
to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, 9
April 1999, DSR 1999:II, 725; Decision by the Arbitrator, Brazil – Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB, 28 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, 19;
Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ –
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, DSR 2002:VI, 2517; Decision by the
Arbitrators, United States – Antidumping Act of 1916, Original Complaint by the European
Communities – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/
DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004, DSR 2004:IX, 4269; Decision by the Arbitrators, United
States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Brazil –
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/
BRA, 31 August 2004, DSR 2004:IX, 4341; Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada – Export
Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS222/ARB, 17
February 2003, DSR 2003:III, 1187; Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Subsidies
on Upland Cotton – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB, 31 August 2009.
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Complainants’ success rates vary widely and differ significantly from the
results observed in substantive adjudication. Yet, more striking is the sharp
separation between what they can accomplish as litigants in Article 21(3)(c)
and 21(5) proceedings versus Article 22(6) arbitrations. As expected, this
breakdown of erstwhile Complainants’ systematic pattern of wins tracks the
shift in the nature of interests they represent in ‘level of suspension’ arbitra-
tions. At this stage, due to the nature of WTO remedies (generally retaliation
against the recalcitrant member’s exports), erstwhile Complainants are pur-
suing trade restrictions. They are now on the opposite side, facing an adju-
dicatory system that favors a liberal version of free trade (see Section II
discussion on substantive adjudication) and is invested in ensuring timely
and full compliance with prior rulings (as are erstwhile Complainants), but
is clearly weary of approving new trade restrictions at the level erstwhile
Complainants desire.
One also observes litigant reversals in Article 21(3)(c) Arbitrations, yet no
decline in erstwhile Complainant success rates. This is easy to explain and
further corroborates the earlier expectation that the interest represented, not
initial posture, matters. First, erstwhile Complainants actually won all four
cases in which they appeared as Respondents. Second, and more important-
ly, erstwhile Complainants’ high success rates in ‘reasonable time’ arbitra-
tions are attributable to their pursuing timely compliance, not trade
restrictions. Finally, they do well because their opponents (i.e. erstwhile
Respondents) are typically resisting compliance by arguing for a longer in-
terpretation of the reasonable time to comply. Thus, erstwhile Complainants
are unlikely to sue prematurely, as doing so undermines cooperation and
reduces the likelihood of voluntary compliance. Having won in substantive
litigation, a wait-and-see strategy on the part of erstwhile Complainants in-
creases the chances of compliance or success should subsequent litigation
prove necessary. Meanwhile, erstwhile Respondents know that they can only
play for time and eventually comply or face sanctions.
Viewed in this light, erstwhile Complainants’ performance across these
case categories confirms the sense that judicialization through DSB proceed-
ings is a success, at least as far as compliance adjudication is concerned (of
course, substantive litigation is a different story). Indeed, this analysis reveals
that compliance proceedings overwhelmingly preserve the results that
Table 4. Erstwhile Complainant win rates in compliance cases
Compliance case type Erstwhile Complainant
success rate (%)
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration 92.31
Article 21(5) Review 92.31
Article 22(6) Arbitration 33.33
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winners obtained in prior adjudication, protecting the interests such litigation
vindicated only insofar as they further trade liberalization. One should also
recognize that adjudicators are helped by the fact that they face a much
clearer set of questions here than in substantive litigation. At this stage, an
offending member can either comply within a reasonable period or not; the
object of such compliance is no longer some abstract norm, but a prior
ruling by usually the same set of panelists; and determination of lawful
levels of retaliation in monetary terms, while technical at times, does not
necessarily require complex hermeneutic analysis. Arguably, previously sen-
sitized adjudicators, reviewing generally less complex questions, with more
available information, can more easily distinguish genuine compliance issues
from mere dilatory tactics or cheating behavior. In combination with the
effect of shifts in erstwhile Complainant and Respondent interests, these
additional features help explain why bias need not be present at this stage
to ensure that WTO adjudication is self-consistent.
One could challenge the validity of these findings by arguing that mere
investigation of fully adjudicated compliance disputes cannot provide an
understanding of the general nature of WTO compliance adjudication, as
several disputes are settled after filing and others might be settled with no
filing ever taking place. Arguments for the existence of a case selection effect
in the compliance context fail for two reasons. First, post-filing settlement
activity has a limited impact in the compliance litigation context, as
three-quarters of all cases (61 of 81 cases) in which a panel or arbitrator
was requested have been fully adjudicated.82 This high full-adjudication-
to-filings ratio is the exact opposite of patterns observed in US civil litigation,
where only 1.8 percent83 of federal civil cases84 are fully adjudicated and up
to 72 percent of the disputes are terminated due to settlements.85 Clearly,
the low frequency of post-filing settlements in WTO compliance cases
undercuts the selection argument, as the subset of fully adjudicated disputes
is fairly representative of what takes place in overall litigation. Second, that
82 See Table 1.
83 Percentage from 2002. See Marc Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts’, 1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 459
(2004), at 461.
84 Note that even in the realm of litigation that often involves high monetary stakes and litigants
with substantial resources, such as intellectual property cases, the rate of trials as a percentage
of dispositions is very low (2.4% in the USA). See ibid, at 463; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
2007 Patent and Trademark Damages Study (2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/
service.nsf/docid/3ca24a75615f03948025711e004b69a0/$fil e/2007_Patent_Study.pdf (report-
ing that the median award amount for 2005 was $6,000,000).
85 See Gillian Hadfield, ‘Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases’, 1 Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 705 (2004), at 729–33 (using data from 2000, including consent
judgments, but not cases disposed of through abandonment or default).
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settlements might have occurred following substantive adjudication, thus
eliminating potential compliance case filings—indeed, 75 out of 117 substan-
tive rulings never led to compliance filings86—does not produce a selection
effect relevant in this context. Because compliance adjudication is only con-
cerned with cases involving resistance to compliance, the occurrence of settle-
ments is irrelevant to this form of litigation since parties obviously agreed to
comply.
4. The aftermath of compliance litigation
The above analysis of compliance cases reveals an adjudicatory system oper-
ating with high consistency, with erstwhile Complainants achieving a high
rate of success so long as they maintain pro-free trade positions. Of course,
this still leaves the question of whether winners are made whole through the
system, meaning when all litigation is done. As Table 2 demonstrates, the
DSB adjudicated disputes concerning the level of suspension of concessions
due to non-compliance in nine cases.87 It authorized suspension of conces-
sions in six cases.88 Of these, actual retaliation occurred in only four in-
stances, as Canada and Brazil chose not to impose largely offsetting
sanctions upon each other in the aftermath of their aircraft disputes.89
Only two of the WTO’s most powerful members, the EC (two cases) and
the USA (two cases), failed to comply after compliance litigation had run its
86 See Table 1 and accompanying discussion.
87 See also Appendix A containing detailed information about these cases and the level of sus-
pensions authorized.
88 The suspensions were granted at DSB meetings based on the requests of the WTO members
in the following disputes: DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/59 (19 April 1999) & WT/DSB/
M/80 (18 May 2000), request by US & Ecuador in European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/
65 (26 July 1999), requests by Canada and US in European Communities – Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),WT/DS48 & WT/DS26; DSB Meeting
Minutes, WT/DSB/M/94 (12 December 2000), request by Canada in Brazil – Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/149 (7
May 2003), request by the EC in United States – Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales (FSC),
WT/DS108; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/145 (18 May 2003), request by Brazil in
Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222; DSB
Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/180 (17 December 2004) & WT/DSB/M/178 (26 November
2004), requests by Brazil, EC, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico and Chile in United
States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd), WT/ DS217 & WT/DS234. On 11
November 2009, the WTO granted Brazil the right to apply sanctions against US products up
to $294.7 million annually. Daniel Pruzin, ‘Brazil Gains WTO OK to Impose Sanctions Over
U.S. Cotton Subsidies, Weighs IP Rights’, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA), 26
November 2009, 1624. This authorization was not included in this article because I only
considered decisions made through September 2009.
89 See Daniel Pruzin, Brazil, ‘Canada Agree to Postpone Action On Sanctions Request Over
Aircraft Subsidy’, 19 International Trade Reporter (BNA), 6 June 2002, 1007.
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course and submitted to retaliation.90 After a period of retaliation, the USA
eventually complied.91 In December 2009, the EC reached an agreement
with the USA and other interested Latin American countries, who agreed
to terminate WTO adjudication in return for a firm commitment from
Europe to lower tariffs on banana imports over a period of time.92 Due to
the implications of this settlement on its parallel commitment to African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) banana producing nations, the EC offered
ACP nations tariff reductions on other tropical imports, a supposedly
WTO-compliant compromise likely to be included in a final Doha Round
grand bargain.93 As of this writing, the EC, citing strong public sentiment
against removing restrictions on the importation of hormone-treated beef,94
90 Sanctions have been imposed in the following cases: Decision by the Arbitrators, European
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, 9
April 1999, DSR 1999:II, 725 (for more information, see Gary G. Yerkey and Daniel
Pruzin, ‘U.S. Issues Final List of European Imports to Be Hit with Higher Duties in
Banana Row’, 16 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 621, 14 April 1999, and Alberto
Alemano, ‘European Court Rejects Damages Claim from Innocent Bystanders in EU-US
‘‘Banana War’’’, 12 ASIL Insights 21 (11 October 2008); Decision by the Arbitrators,
European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Recourse
to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB, 12
July 1999, DSR 1999:III, 1105 (see Gary G. Yerkey, ‘U.S. Announces Final List of EU
Imports Targeted for Higher Duties in Beef Dispute’, 16 International Trade Reporter
(BNA) 1212, 21 July 1999; Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Tax Treatment for
‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, DSR
2002:VI, 2517 (see Alison Bennet and Katherine M. Stimmel, ‘Grassley, Baucus ETI
Repeal Legislation Likely to Help Domestic Manufacturers’, 20 International Trade Reporter
(BNA) 1156, 10 August 2003; Joe Kirwin and Alison Bennett, ‘EU Concerned Over
Grandfather Clause in Export Bill; No Decision Yet’, 21 International Trade Reporter (BNA)
1714, 21 October 2004; Daniel Pruzin and Alison Bennett, ‘EU Challenges Transition Relief
Under New Export Tax Legislation’, 21 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1825, 11
November 2004); Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Original Complaint by Brazil – Recourse to Arbitration by the
United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, 31 August 2004, DSR
2004:IX, 4341 (see Daniel Pruzin, ‘EU Reduces by Half U.S. Imports Targeted for Duties in
Byrd Dispute’, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 622, 7 May 2009; Rossella Brevetti and
Michael O’Boyle, ‘EC, Canada Move to Impose Retaliatory Duties in Byrd Dispute’, 22
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 546, 7 April 2005; Michael O’Boyle, ‘Mexico Slaps
Punitive Duties on U.S. Goods Due to Noncompliance with WTO Byrd Ruling’, 22
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1386, 25 August 2005; Daniel Pruzin, ‘Remaining
Complainants Warn of Intent to Proceed With Byrd Sanctions by July’, 22 International
Trade Reporter (BNA) 938, 9 June 2005).
91 See Gary G. Yerkey, ‘Dispute Resolution: Compliance Record of WTO Members in Dispute
Settlement Cases ‘‘Very Good’’ ’, WTO Reporter (BNA), 5 May 2008 (stating that the United
States Congress passed legislation in 2004–05 to repeal all acts which were inconsistent with
WTO rulings).
92 Daniel Pruzin, ‘Agriculture: EU, Latin, U.S. Officials Welcome Beginning of End to WTO
Dispute on Banana Imports’, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1733, 17 December
2009.
93 Ibid.
94 Davey, above n 25, at 33.
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has yet to comply with the Hormones decision. However, the EC reached a
side-agreement with the USA allowing it to maintain current restrictions in
exchange for duty-free treatment for hormone-free beef. Under this agree-
ment, the USA retains the right to continue suspending concessions, which
will be gradually phased out in four years.95 In its similar, more recent
agreement with Canada, the latter agreed to discontinue suspension of con-
cessions at once instead of phasing them out.96
Arguably, it would be unfair to characterize EC conduct in these two
instances as demonstrative of outright disregard for compliance with inter-
national trade law or that its leaders care little about its reputation for
keeping promises. Paradoxically, at least in the context of the Bananas dis-
pute, EC recalcitrance resulted from caring about their reputation for keep-
ing promises of preferential treatment to bananas from ACP countries
pursuant to another agreement. Certainly, this agreement was adjudicated
as non-compliant with WTO law, and the EC took some time to comply.
Presumably, that was the case because compliance required reconciling two
separate, competing reputational concerns, EC’s commitments to ACP
countries and to other WTO members. Thus, recalcitrance occurred not
because of the EC’s outright indifference to compliance with international
commitments, but precisely because it valued one commitment more than
the other.97 While, arguably, this disaggregated, contextualized view of the
EC’s reputational concerns does not account for EC non-compliance in the
one remaining case (i.e. Hormones), it suggests that one must proceed with
caution before making general statements about non-compliance, especially
when one views its rare occurrence as a major problem. Either way, one, two,
four or six cases of recalcitrance do not negate the overwhelming record of
compliance. After all litigation is done, erstwhile Complainants overwhelm-
ingly obtain what they won in substantive adjudication.
IV. REASSESSING THE ROLE OF NON-COMPLIANCE
A. Legalist and pragmatist views on non-compliance
As in the GATT years, the prospect of occasional non-compliance with dis-
pute settlement decisions has inspired debate about the proper level of sanc-
tions in international trade law. Legalists still interpret non-compliance as a
95 Gary G. Yerkey and Daniel Pruzin, ‘Agriculture: U.S. Farm Group Disappointed with Deal
to Expand Hormone-Free Beef Sales to EU’, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 643,
14 May 2009; Gary G. Yerkey, ‘Agriculture: U.S., EU Announce Provisional Deal in
Long-Running Dispute Over Beef Trade’, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 611,
7 May 2009.
96 Daniel Pruzin, ‘Agriculture: EU, Canada Announce Provisional Deal to End Dispute on
Hormone-Treated Beef’, WTO Reporter (BNA) D6, 22 March, 2011.
97 For a similar argument in support of a nuanced, disaggregated view of reputation and
non-compliance, see Goldsmith and Posner, above n 27, at 102–04.
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threat to the trade system because, presumably, it allows protectionism to go
unchecked. They do recognize that ‘the overall good record’ of compliance is
primarily due ‘to the good faith desire of WTO members to see the dispute
settlement system work effectively’.98 The remedy, they suggest, is more
detailed substantive and procedural rules,99 further strengthening adjudica-
tion outcomes by allowing multilateral sanctions,100 and generally a broader,
more diversified array of sanctions.101
More pragmatically inclined scholars argue that further judicialization and
strengthening of sanctions are unlikely to work because enforcement would
still depend on the will of states, not third-party adjudicators bereft of au-
tonomous agency powers.102 Pragmatists believe that members themselves
might not be so keen on stronger sanctions and multilateral enforcement.
Some of them believe harsher enforcement rules might cause members to
step back on enforcement because they would want to ‘retain the flexibility
to raise trade barriers when protectionist pressures surge’.103 Others, still
within this pragmatist group, might argue that members would stay their
hand under harsher rules not because they might engage in protectionism,
but because they might want to exercise the discretion they retained under
the agreements in the pursuit of legitimate trade restrictive measures more
suited to their societies, with less fear of exposure to tougher sanctions
should the system rule against them.104
Furthermore, if members embraced collective sanctions, the proposed re-
forms would have a perverse result, which legalists may not have fully
thought through. Under a multilateral sanction regime, third-party state pro-
tectionists would be the only group to gain from suspending concessions
against the ‘scofflaw’ state, as export groups in enforcing states ‘would be
indifferent to any sanctioning strategy because they would not have been
affected by the trade-inconsistent measure’.105 In fact, should third-party
states with weak protectionist constituencies choose retaliation as a bargain-
ing strategy to secure trade concessions from the scofflaw state, they would
not succeed. Under collective sanctions, any settlement offer would have to
98 Davey, above n 78, at 125.
99 See Davey, above n 4, at 117–22.
100 See Pauwelyn, above n 4, at 345.
101 See ibid, at 344–46; Davey, above n 78, at 122–26; Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Remedies in the
WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 11 European Journal of
International Law 763 (2000), at 795–808.
102 See Goldsmith and Posner, above n 27, at 161–62.
103 See ibid, at 162.
104 Unfortunately, the possibility that members might resort to trade restrictive measures for
reasons other than protectionism, as in the pursuit of legitimate policy concerns (e.g. adopt-
ing stricter health standards, protecting natural resources, etc.) has not been sufficiently
considered in the literature. But see Colares, above n 2, at 438 and Rodrik, above n 62,
at 199.
105 See Nzelibe, above n 79, at 335–36.
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be extended to all members (by operation of the MFN principle), whose cost
would be no different than the cost of retaliation.106 Finally, even in the
unlikely event that overall transaction and settlement costs did not equal
the cost of retaliation, the proliferation of PTAs would itself be an unwel-
come result in a multilateral system.
In fairness, legalists do not focus only on instances of non-compliance and
how to remedy them. Their reform proposals also target timeliness of com-
pliance as a problem, since delayed implementation can be a viable tactic
until (and if) retaliation is authorized. Davey, for instance, proposes speeding
up the entire litigation system, especially compliance deadlines, as he per-
ceives them to be excessively generous.107 He regrets that the prospective
nature of WTO remedies provides little incentive for offending members to
comply within the 15-month maximum ‘reasonable compliance’ period.108
He proposes not only shortening this to ‘six or nine months,’ but also start-
ing the clock for compliance prior to the last day of such period, for ex-
ample, on the ‘date of adoption of the relevant report or date of panel
establishment or even earlier.’109 Mavroidis even suggests allowing erstwhile
Complainants to request suspension of concessions prior to a formal decision
on an Article 21(5) Review,110 which, at present, must be decided before
suspension requests can be adjudicated.111 He argues that combining such
requests in one proceeding would go a long way towards reducing offending
members’ ability to further delay compliance by extending litigation.112
While generous deadlines and procedural avenues may be abused, they do
exist for particularly instrumental reasons. In the absence of a veto, they give
members time and flexibility to adjust their practices while considering al-
ternatives to offending policies, even avoiding non-compliance altogether.
Making the WTO system more legalistic in the direction Davey and
Mavroidis propose would accelerate the arrival of the retaliation stage and
put the system under more stress. With less time for internal deliberations,
some powerful offending members might choose to absorb the cost of retali-
ation and remain non-compliant. Meanwhile, less powerful members would
be facing quite asymmetric incentives: as winners, they might hesitate to
sanction the powerful; as losers they will have less time to comply or be
ready to face sanctions. Moreover, this could further encourage bilateralism
and trade displacement by pushing members to negotiate PTAs, as these can
replace formerly illegal barriers with WTO-compliant barriers, without im-
proving efficiency. Such developments would severely undermine good faith
106 See ibid, at 336.
107 See Davey, above n 4, at 117–22.
108 DSU at Art. 21(3)(c).
109 See Davey, above n 4, at 121, 126.
110 Mavroidis, above n 101, at 795.
111 See DSU, at Art. 22(2).
112 Mavroidis, above n 100, at 795.
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among members, potentially causing the multilateral system to unravel. In
sum, by making the system too brittle, further legalization of international
trade risks too much.
In fact, even assuming that trade diplomats, succumbing to legal process/
constructivist influences,113 convinced themselves that further judicialization
and stricter rules and deadlines would benefit all, it would hardly follow that
the states they represent would subsequently abide by these reforms. That
trade negotiators might lean toward greater normativity at one point does
not imply that they will continue to do so later when domestic interests are
directly at stake, as in the end of litigation. In its simplest form, the com-
pliance ‘problem’—as the original substantive violations that create it in the
first place—occurs due to a mismatch between a member’s WTO commit-
ments and either prevailing domestic political economic interests or deeply
held social values that must be politically tended to. Such mismatches may
develop and even intensify over time. As Trachtman suggests, the prevailing
political constituencies backing entry into an agreement at one point may
either change with time or, even if they remain in control, might undergo
preference shifts as circumstances change.114 Because compliance seems to
depend ‘on the constellation of domestic political forces in the relevant
state,’115 at a given point in time, the possibility of retaliation and reputa-
tional loss, by itself, cannot exact compliance. Thus, it is more likely that the
relative influence of trade-restricting and anti-sanction groups, not external
forces or ‘internationalist’ trade diplomats, determines whether compliance
will occur.116 It is true that harsher enforcement rules give more leverage to
the anti-sanction camp, yet they may still not prevail if the losing member is
persuaded by the other camp that it cannot compromise on an issue deemed
to be of ‘great national importance.’117
B. The role and merits of non-compliance
Legalists believe that increasing the sanctions for breach of WTO obligations
would increase the commitment level of WTO members. This generally as-
sumes that the existing sanction (i.e. suspension of concessions following
bilateral substantive and compliance litigation) is somehow suboptimal.
113 See Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Internalization through Socialization’, 54 Duke Law Journal 975
(2005), at 981 (arguing that, over time, government officials from different states, influenced
by their interactions with international institutions and each other, may undergo a switch in
preferences that will favor greater norm internalization over their own states’ more parochial
interests).
114 See Joel P. Trachtman, ‘International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand
Theory of Compliance with International Law’ 1, 11 (18 April 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1549337 (visited 16 June 2010).
115 See ibid, at 21.
116 Answering this empirical question would be beyond the scope of this article.
117 See Guzman, above n 64, at 321.
The Limits of WTO Adjudication 431
The discussion above (Section IV A) suggests why that is not the case.
Indeed, members, whose actions are often the product of considered calcu-
lations reflecting domestic interests, might not be so keen on a more severe
enforcement system that would limit the remaining flexibility they have in
trade policy, especially in light of the consistent record of Complainant wins
in WTO adjudication. In a way, it is as if legalists were arguing from the
perspective of a dissatisfied adjudicator, in whose institutional view a few
instances of less than full compliance are ipso facto proof that compliance
incentives are less than adequate. While it would be unfair to characterize
legalists as essentially making the same ‘strengthening the system’ arguments
that WTO adjudicators and Secretariat staff are likely to endorse, it is un-
questionable that the reforms they propose would lead to yet more judicia-
lization and transfer of authority from members to adjudicators, with
potentially disastrous results.
More plausibly, legalists make these arguments because they overempha-
size the adjudicative dimension of the WTO system while underestimating its
far more important political dimensions (both international and domestic).
They generally fail to see that adjudication, as a generally egalitarian mode of
interaction, is, in principle, unresponsive to the logic of power and the im-
plications resulting from power asymmetries. True, WTO litigants are equal
before the law and play by rules of engagement that, at least as far as court-
room activity is concerned, ‘do not permit them to deploy all their resources
in the conflict, but require that they proceed within the limiting forms’ of
adjudication.118 Yet, when the assumption of adjudicative equality clashes
(outside the courtroom) with the reality of power as it expresses itself in
outright non-compliance or delayed compliance—the US and the EC are
the only members to have endured sanctions while not complying—legalists
react by proposing reforms that would make the system more like domestic
adjudication, where enforcement is presumed optimal.119 In doing so, they
rarely give full consideration to the political and systemic repercussions of
their presumably apolitical reforms. Obviously, the DSB system is not merely
about adjudication. In fact, a more nuanced political view of the DSB’s ju-
dicial function counsels against not only shifting members’ rights and obli-
gations ‘in a systematic way [that] would contradict the delicate political
balancing act that characterizes multilateral trade negotiations,’120 as has
happened in substantive adjudication, but also placing further restraints on
118 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the ‘‘Haves’’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change’, 9 Law and Society Review 95 (1974), at 135.
119 Davey recognizes that ‘most long-term non-compliance has occurred in disputes between
developed countries’, but does not investigate further why that might be the case. See Davey,
above n 78, at 123 n 30.
120 Richard H. Steinberg, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints’, 98 American Journal of International Law 247 (2004), at 250.
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members’ ability to cope with and adapt to the effects of DSB decisions, as
legalists now propose.
Having won the earlier Uruguay Round battle that led to more judicialized
proceedings and clearer sanctions over GATT’s looser framework, where
states could openly negotiate on a case-by-case basis and even block the
adoption of decisions,121 legalists seem to be pressing their case too hard
this time. First, in light of the evidence presented in Section III B.3 and 4,
outright non-compliance is rare and mostly reflects situations where powerful
nations have faced complex choices as they attempt to balance domestic
pressures against important policy considerations (Hormones, FSC and
Byrd) or competing multilateral concerns (Bananas). Similarly, rather than
abuse of process, instances of delay followed by compliance might be viewed
more generously, allowing the possibility of sanctions and the passage of time
to work together. Second, as discussed in Section IV A, shorter deadlines
and steeper sanctions will not strengthen the system’s normativity if
third-party adjudicators, lacking the power of agency, have to rely on mem-
bers’ enforcement capabilities, who themselves face asymmetric incentives to
comply and punish. Indeed, one (bilateral) version of this harsher enforce-
ment regime might even lead to a hard-to-reverse spiral toward bilateralism,
as members scramble to evade sanctions by negotiating PTAs that displace
more efficient producers, undermining good faith among members and
demoralizing those in favor of multilateralism. A multilateral or collective
sanction system would fare no better.
Finally, with the advent of the DSU, members signed away the possibility
of blocking enforcement by adopting the reverse consensus rule. A triumph
of legalism, no doubt, this implies that, in politically sensitive disputes, mem-
bers now have fewer options when facing adverse outcomes. In such a
system, members’ valuation of time undergoes a profound change.
Specifically, after a period of violation and subsequent litigation, a protracted
return to compliance might become the next best alternative, as the passage
of time might be sufficient to appease prevailing trade-restricting constitu-
encies.122 In fact, time becomes even more important to the non-cynical
violator who, genuinely believing no violation was committed, will attempt
to mitigate the effects of an adverse decision by either delaying compliance,
not complying and submitting to sanctions or proposing concessions in other
areas.123 If one recalls that the veto’s abrogation was part and parcel of a
121 See William J. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in GATT’, 11 Fordham International Law
Journal 51 (1987), at 94–6.
122 Goldsmith and Posner make a similar argument to explain members’ return to compliance.
See Goldsmith and Posner, above n 27, at 157.
123 See, e.g. Daniel Pruzin, ‘U.S. Reaches Agreement with EU at WTO on Compensation for
Internet Gambling’, 24 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1788, 20 December 2007
(quoting Gretchen Hamel, Spokeswoman for the Office of the US Trade Representative,
stating that ‘the binding commitments will be extended to all WTO members’).
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move toward increased judicialization of the world trade system, which
replaced regular diplomatic negotiations with a permanent Appellate Body
and continuously evolving trade jurisprudence, one may plausibly argue that
recalcitrance and low levels of non-compliance might play an inevitable, even
necessary ‘cushioning’ role in the system.
V. CONCLUSION
International trade law scholars have demonstrably different views on com-
pliance and enforcement of legal obligations. One of the important research
questions in the field, a point in which scholars have marked disagreement,
pertains to the desirability of further reforms to strengthen compliance. This
article considers their different arguments in succession and attempts to
integrate into this debate insights derived from prior empirical studies on
substantive adjudication, adding a new empirical analysis of compliance ad-
judication. These analyses show that Complainants’ systematic high rates of
success in substantive adjudication can be attributed to WTO adjudicators’
adoption of a liberal view of free trade that furthers the interests
Complainants typically represent at that stage, but that the latter only
attain a similar degree of success in compliance litigation when they continue
to act on behalf of pro-free trade interests. For example, erstwhile
Complainants win only one in three level-of-retaliation disputes; i.e. disputes
where they are pursuing trade restrictions as the final punishment for non-
compliance.
Viewed in combination, these modes of litigation reveal an adjudicatory
system operating with high consistency, yet exhibiting favoritism toward a
particular teleological view of free trade, expressed not in favor of the litigant
who originally defended it, but in favor of whoever argues for it in any given
instance. In light of the way the system has operated, with members’
reserved regulatory discretion under continuous attack from a jurisprudence
bent on furthering a liberal view of trade, it is remarkable that compliance
levels have remained high, despite members’ occasional, strong criticism.124
That few architects of increased legalization ‘contemplated the possibility
that in interpreting WTO agreements, the [AB] would engage in expansive
lawmaking’125—a view that, in hindsight, seems a bit naı¨ve—should cause
scholars to be a bit more cautious when considering yet more rigidifying
124 See Dunoff, above n 25, at 353 (discussing US proposals ‘ ‘‘to increase party control over the
dispute settlement process,’’ and US and Chile’s arguments for the desirability of providing
‘‘additional guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies,’’ including with respect to the rules of
interpretation of the WTO agreements, and ensuring that panel members have appropriate
expertise’). (Quoting Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States (14 March 2003)
TN/DS/W/52.)
125 Steinberg, above n 120, at 251 n 27 (citing telephone interview with A. Jane Bradley, former
Assistant US Trade Representative for Monitoring and Enforcement and US Representative
to the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Negotiations).
434 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 14(2)
reforms. In fact, the remaining alternatives for coping with the way in which
the DSB system has operated may be viewed, in a sense, as the new veto.
Simply put, reforming the system to make it yet more ‘legalistic’ would be
unwarranted, as such proposals would make it too rigid and unaccommo-
dating and might push its more powerful members toward outright bilater-
alism, eventually causing it to collapse. In fact, compliance is the least of the
system’s problems.
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